Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency by Rory Cormac

Author:Rory Cormac [Cormac, Rory]
Language: eng
Format: mobi, azw3
Tags: Europe, International Relations, True Crime, Revolutions & Wars of Independence, General, Intelligence & Espionage, Great Britain, Espionage, Political Science, Military, British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency, History
ISBN: 9780199354436
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2013-01-15T05:54:32.597433+00:00

Broader Reflections

By the mid-1960s, the JIC had acquired an increased confidence and status within the Whitehall hierarchy. With this however, came responsibility and vulnerability. Greater access to policy practitioners and ministers brought greater influence in the policymaking process. However, such newfound relevance pushed strategic intelligence towards the choppy waters of politicisation. As the central intelligence machinery’s status grew, so too did the potential for its assessments to become mired in departmental rivalries and for the subtle manipulation of objective assessment.

The producer-consumer relationship

JIC threat assessments possessed a higher Whitehall profile. The committee had moved away from the narrow militaristic topics that characterised the intelligence agenda during earlier insurgencies. However, the JIC did not operate in a political vacuum. Intelligence assessments were subjected to the winds of Whitehall—the vigorous buffetings from across the interested departments. The committee initially acted as a moderating influence by disseminating information that displeased certain consumers in the Colonial Office. As such, it found itself most often aligned with Foreign Office ideas and, initially at least, downplayed some of the more pugnacious rhetoric emanating from the Colonial Office. Whilst a useful function, certain colonial sources were perhaps too easily dismissed in favour of their Foreign Office and GCHQ counterparts. Fear of bias and politicisation can skew intelligence assessments just as much as actual bias.

Policymakers drew upon JIC threat assessments on a number of occasions. These included firstly when considering the nature of the threat; secondly when discussing covert action; and thirdly when excogitating strategic regional policies. The latter case demonstrated an effective intelligence system whereby objective analysis was presented without political weight to policy staffs from which policy could be formulated. On other occasions however the committee’s assessments were subtly manipulated in order to support a pre-conceived idea relating to Egyptian violent subversion or covert action. Similarly, the JIC was specifically asked to find (sometimes uncorroborated) intelligence implicating Egypt that could be published for political purposes—leaving a dangerous impression of the JIC being used as a tool in the policymaking process.

A fundamental principle of British intelligence assessment is that it remains objective and provides assessments of a given situation based on the available intelligence. It should not stray into the realm of policy prescription. Although avoiding outright policy instructions (which were well beyond the JIC’s jurisdiction and authority), the committee, perhaps indicative of its increased status and confidence, did stray into the realm of policy advice. It warned against the devolution of authority to local commanders regarding photo reconnaissance and retaliation. However, such policy requires a particular amount of input from intelligence authorities. This was also the case regarding the Joint Action Committee, in which JIC personnel were heavily involved. Again, however, the JAC did not formulate policy itself and dealt with intelligence-specific policy in which input from the JIC was integral and which must be differentiated from broader policies.

JIC threat assessments changed emphasis in spring 1964: they began increasingly to highlight violent and coordinated Egyptian subversion. The task of assessing the levels and nature of external influence and its interplay with internal factors was a tricky one.

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